We study the relationship between state-level public opinion and the roll call votes of senators on Supreme Court nominees. Applying recent advances in multilevel modeling, we use national polls on nine recent Supreme Court nominees to produce state-of-theart estimates of public support for the confirmation of each nominee in all 50 states. We show that greater public support strongly increases the probability that a senator will vote to approve a nominee, even after controlling for standard predictors of roll call voting. We also find that the impact of opinion varies with context: it has a greater effect on opposition party senators, on ideologically opposed senators, and for generally weak nominees. These results establish a systematic and powerful link between constituency opinion and voting on Supreme Court nominees.
Introduction
The judiciary is the branch of the federal government most insulated from public influence.
Federal judges are unelected and have lifetime appointments. Supreme Court justices, atop the federal judicial hierarchy, need not even worry about promotions to a higher court.
This leaves them largely unconstrained in their decision-making, which ultimately reaches the most controversial policy areas. While judicial independence has obvious advantages, leaving the justices free from improper influence, free to make impartial decisions, and free to protect the rights of unpopular minorities, "too much" independence also raises foundational concerns over how counter-majoritarian the Court might be (see Friedman 1998, inter alia) Scholars have long debated whether the justices of the Court are influenced by public opinion in their decision making (Mishler and Sheehan 1993 , Norpoth et al. 1994 , Flemming and Wood 1997 , Hoekstra 2000 , Giles, Blackstone and Vining 2008 . Less noticed has been the possibility that the public might influence who sits on the Court in addition to what the justices decide. The decision to appoint and confirm a justice is in the hands of the presidents and senators, but the electoral incentives, particularly for senators, potentially tie the Court back to the public.
1 Given these incentives, does the public play a key role in confirmation politics? Or do partisan loyalties and the senator's own ideology trump constituent preference?
Senate lore contains ominous warnings for senators who ignore the public when casting confirmation votes. Despite being virtually unknown, Carol Mosley Braun defeated incumbent Senator Alan Dixon in the Illinois Democratic primary, principally campaigning against his vote in favor of Clarence Thomas (McGrory 1992) . Indeed, Wolpert and Gimpel (1997) 1 As Dahl (1957) notes, one would not expect the Supreme Court to stray too far from the mainstream, because justices are nominated by presidents and confirmed by senators, all of whom will be at least somewhat representative of the public.
1 showed systematically using 1992 Senate election data that voters nationwide did cast their votes in part based on their reactions to their senators' vote on the Thomas nomination.
Few decisions made by U.S. senators are as visible to the public as votes to confirm or reject a Supreme Court nominee. While the outcomes of many Senate votes, such as spending bills or the modification of a statute, are ambiguous, or obscured in procedural detail, the result of vote on a Supreme Court nomination is stark: either the nominee is confirmed, allowing her to serve on the nation's highest court, or she is rejected, forcing the president to name another candidate.
2 In this process, note Watson and Stookey (1995, 19) , Given the visibility of roll call votes on Supreme Court nominees, and the stakes for controversial policies at the heart of recent elections, such as abortion rights, we expect reelection-minded senators to pay close attention to the views of their constituents. Whether they do so, anecdotes aside, remains an open question. Twenty years ago, Caldeira (1988 Caldeira ( -1989 ) urged students of the nomination and confirmation process to account for the role of "organized and unorganized" interests, including those of the public at large. Using various proxies for state public opinion, the few studies that have examined the relationship between the two have reached conflicting conclusions (e.g., cf. Segal, Cameron and Cover (1992) with Caldeira and Wright (1998) ). More recent work has studied the changing dynamics of nomination politics (focusing primarily on partisan, ideological, and legal factors), but has set aside the possible effects of public opinion.
In this paper, we study whether senators are actually responsive to the views of their constituents when casting their votes on the confirmation of a nominee. Specifically, we analyze the relationship between state-level public opinion and roll call votes on Supreme 2 We use "she" to denote justices and "he" to denote senators throughout the paper.
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Court nominees. We begin by producing state-of-the-art estimates of the public's support in all 50 states, for each nominee. These make use of recent advances in multilevel modeling to generate highly accurate estimates from national polls asking about support for nine recent Supreme Court nominees. These estimates of opinion are a significant advance over earlier efforts: they can be generated for a broader range of nominees than was previously possible; they account for geographic variation among poll respondents; and they specifically capture state-level support for confirmation. These advances move us beyond simple correlation between roll call voting and state demographics or between roll call voting and diffuse constituent ideology.
We find that greater home-state public support does significantly and powerfully increase the probability that a senator will vote to approve a nominee, even controlling for standard predictors of roll call voting: ideological distance between the senator and the nominee, the party of the senator, and the quality of the nominee. Next, we find that the impact of opinion varies with context: it has a greater effect on opposition party senators, on ideologically opposed senators, and for weak nominees. These results establish a strong and systematic link between constituent opinion and voting on Supreme Court nominees. We also find that only senator ideology has a greater impact on confirmation vote on average.
This suggest that, while constituent preference matters a great deal, the senator still has some leeway when voting on nominees. Our results extend beyond the direct substantive implications for confirmation politics and speak to larger debates about representation and responsiveness in the U.S. Senate.
2 Opinion, representation, and confirmation votes
Linking public opinion to roll call votes. While the goals of members of Congress are multifaceted, the desire for reelection has long been established as a powerful driver, if 3 not the primary driver, of congressional behavior, including roll call voting (Mayhew 1974) .
Although the six-year terms of senators provide them with greater insulation compared to House members, a reelection-minded senator will constantly consider how his votes may affect approval back home. This will be particularly true of highly visible votes, such as whether to authorize a war, votes on taxes, and high profile nominations, such as cabinet positions or Supreme Court justices. During confirmation battles, the public turns its attention to a nominee's fate. For instance, in the periods around Justice Thomas's and Justice Alito's confirmations, 95% and 88% of Americans, respectively, held an opinion about confirming them Wolpert 1996, Gibson and Caldeira 2009) . During the Alito nomination, 75% of Americans thought it important that their senators vote in accordance with their preferred outcome (Gibson and Caldeira 2009 ). Accordingly, a vote on a Supreme
Court nominee presents a situation in which a senator is likely to consider constituent views carefully, given the importance placed on nominees.
Cameron, Cover and Segal (1990, 527) set forth this logic nicely:
With respect to motivation, we imagine senators asking themselves, "Can I use my actions during the confirmation process to gain electoral advantage? If I'm forced to account for my votes, can they be used against me? What is the most electorally expedient action for me to have taken?" ... The senator can generally expect to gain electorally (or at least not to lose electorally) from voting as constituents wish and can expect to incur losses from flouting constituents' desires, regardless of the actual outcome of a vote.
Their electoral gain or loss may manifest itself not only in the election directly after a nom- Given this thinking, it is no surprise that presidents often "go public" in support of their nominees in the hope of shifting public opinion (Johnson and Roberts 2004 (Maltese 1998, 87-88) . Appeals to the public in nomination politics date back in fact to the shift to the direct election of senators in 1914 (Maltese 1998, 86) . In 1930, the Republican Senate majority was so concerned about rising public opposition to the appointment of Charles Evans Hughes for Chief Justice that his supporters blocked further hearings and moved to a quick vote, before public opinion could shift any further (Maltese 1998, 55) .
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How do senators' take the pulse of their constituents on Supreme Court nominees? Public opinion polls help inform senators, as do more direct forms of communications such as phone calls and letter writing. 4 Segal, Cameron and Cover (1992) and Caldeira and Wright (1998) argue that interest groups play an important role both in shaping constituency preferences and informing senators of these preferences: "Interest groups attempt to mold senators' perceptions of the direction, intensity and electoral implications of constituency opinion" (Caldeira and Wright 1998, 503) . It is thus likely that most senators will have a good idea of where their constituents stand when they cast a vote on a Supreme Court nominee.
Measuring constituency opinion: previous research. The modern-day analysis of roll call votes on Supreme Court nominees-beginning perhaps with Songer (1979) but certainly no later than Cameron (1988-1989) -has proceeded along two overlapping 3 One of the most striking examples of concern over public opinion occurred after a successful confirmation, that of Hugo Black. Facing public outrage when his prior membership in the Ku Klux Klan was revealed only after the Senate had voted, Black took to the radio to explain himself. The percentage of respondents stating that Black should resign decreased from 59% to 44% following his address (Maltese 1998, 105) . 4 See, e.g., Marcus (1987) and Clymer (1991) for accounts of the intensity of letter writing during the Bork and Thomas nominations, respectively. 5 tracks. The first follows from the pioneering work of Cameron, Cover and Segal (1990) , who found that roll call voting could largely be explained by the interaction of nominee quality and ideological distance between a senator and the nominee. Senators will likely approve a nominee if she is ideologically close or if she is of high legal quality; if both these conditions are not met, however, the probability of approval drops rapidly. Partisanship and the political environment are also important: all else equal, senators are more likely to approve a nominee appointed by a president of the same party and a president who is "strong" in that his party controls the Senate and he is not in his fourth year of office.
Updating both the methodology of Cameron, Cover and Segal (1990) and the number of nominations evaluated, Epstein et al. (2006) found that this model still accurately captures roll call voting, although the effect of ideological distance seems to have grown over time. Shipan (2008) finds similarly as to the influence of partisanship.
The second track has sought to augment the first by incorporating the role of constituency preferences and lobbying interests in addition to institutional, ideological, and nomineespecific factors. Doing so, however, has raised several methodological challenges, especially with respect to measuring constituency preferences. These challenges arise from a harsh constraint-the lack of comparable state-level polls for nominees and thus of "direct" estimates of state-level opinion. As a result, scholars have pursued several alternatives, with various advantages and drawbacks. Because these methods both inform substantive findings in the second track of the literatures and motivate our analysis below, a review is useful.
The most ambitious attempt to measure constituency opinion is that of Segal, Cameron and Cover (1992) , who generated state-level constituent ideology scores using predictions from regressions of congressional voting scores on state presidential election results and indicators for Democrats and Southern Democrats. Based on these, and using scaling procedures to place nominees, senators, and constituents on the same scale, they found that "confirmation voting is decisively affected by the ideological distance between senators' constituents 6 and nominees" (109). 5 That study also found that interest group activity for and against a nominee-measured at the nominee-level rather than the senator-level-significantly affects confirmation votes. Thus, the linkage between constituency ideology and senators' votes seems to be robust to the presence of lobbying efforts.
To be sure, this method of estimating constituency opinion is both innovative and can be applied to all nominees since 1937. 6 There are several disadvantages, however. First, the measure constitutes a broad evaluation of state ideology, and it is not specific to any particular nominee or even Supreme Court nominations more generally. Moreover, because the predictions are generated using only a few presidential elections, the state estimates are static in many periods, meaning that the opinion on all nominees in a given period will be assumed to be the same (and indeed the same as opinion on any other issue). For example, the estimates of constituent "opinions" of Harry Blackmun and Clement Haynsworth are the same, despite their vastly different profiles. Lastly, because constituency opinion is estimated from voting scores, untangling the influence of senator ideology and state opinion requires strong assumptions about the ability to accurately place them on the same scale.
Indeed, given these limits, one can only show the degree and direction of correlation between the diffuse constituent ideology score and senator vote. Without accurate measures of how constituents want these specific votes to be cast, without a common metric for opinion and choice, the inferences we can draw are limited (Erikson, Wright and McIver 1993, 92) .
A high correlation of votes and opinion reveals strong relationship between the two, but if we do not have a meaningful scale for responsiveness, we cannot tell if vote choice is over-or under-responsive to opinion. That is, we can only tell whether more liberal (conservative) 5 Overby et al. (1994) apply this method to votes on Justices Marshall and Thomas and find that support increased and decreased in state liberalism, respectively, as expected. 6 The scaling procedure involved employs Segal-Cover scores (Segal and Cover 1989) , which are only available from 1937-on (Epstein et al. 2006, 298, fn. 4) . 7 constituents lead to more liberal (conservative) votes; we cannot tell whether these votes are the precise votes desired by constituents without a common metric.
A more contextual proxy for constituent opinion is employed in Overby et al. (1992; Again, these studies (Overby et al. 1992; are highly informative and support a conclusion that senators are mindful of constituent wishes when voting for or against Supreme
Court nominees. But this approach is difficult to generalize beyond the unique circumstances of these two nominations, and it relies on assumptions as to what these demographic groups preferred. It also suffers from the same correlation problem discussed above. Here, the problem is that one can only assess the correlation between aggregate demographic percentages and vote, not whether votes were cast precisely as desired by constituents.
These shortcomings point to a need for nominee-specific opinion measures. The most recent attempt to estimate constituency opinion-and the one that most resembles the method we use-comes from Caldeira and Wright (1998) and does provide nominee-specific measures. The authors gathered national polls on the Bork, Thomas, and Souter nominations, and estimated individual-level models of opinion, regressing survey respondents' views of the nominees on race, partisanship, ideology, and rural dwelling. (The next step is, methodologically, one of the main points of departure herein.) Using the parameter estimates from 8 these models, they then generated state-level estimates of opinion by using the mean level of these variables by state. Conducting separate models of confirmation voting on the three nominees, they found that state opinion does not have a significant effect on senators' roll call votes, nor does senator ideology-results that contradict the studies cited above. On the other hand, lobbying for and against a nominee (here measured more precisely at the senator level) are strong predictors of confirming or rejecting a nominee, respectively.
We explain more thoroughly below, but we briefly note two limitations of the method in Caldeira and Wright (1998) . First, it takes into account only demographic variation between respondents, and not geographic variation (Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) showed that a great deal of geographic variation in opinion exists beyond that explained by demographic differences). Second, using the mean values of each demographic variable within a state only approximates the correct weighting of demographic influences on opinion. It does not make use of the true frequencies of each respondent type, which is crucial given that, even setting aside geographic differences, demographic variables interact with each other to influence opinion at the individual level. Doing so requires using the full set of cross-tabulations, and not merely aggregate percentages (i.e., knowing how many black women there are, not just how many blacks and how many women). Fortunately, it is possible to deal with both of these issues, and improve upon accuracy in other ways, given recent advances in estimating local opinion from national poll data.
Data and Methods
Estimating state-level public opinion. We first give an overview of the techniques which allow us to estimate nominee-specific public opinion. The distributions of state support for each nominee are depicted in Figure 1 in order of mean nominee support (the full list of opinion estimates is given in Table 1 ). Nominees are ordered by mean support (indicated by the dashed line), from lowest to highest. Bork had the lowest mean support and also the widest spread of support, while O'Connor was the least controversial nominee, both in terms of mean support and the variance of support across states. In addition, Bork was the only nominee for whom the balance of public opinion in a significant number of states was opposed to his nomination. Thus, among voters with opinion, all but one nominee received broad public support. The bottom histogram depicts support for all nominees combined, revealing that most of the distribution of opinion falls between 60% and 80% support. Despite the overall tendency to support a nominee, the histograms show widespread variation in state support for several nominees.
Roll call voting and state-level opinion. The nine nominees in our sample were each voted on by the full Senate, for a total of 891 confirmation votes (nine senators abstained, in total), 75% (667) of which were to approve the nominee. 9 We begin our analysis by studying the bivariate relationship between public opinion and voting. For each nominee, the dark lines in Figure 2 presents the estimated logit curves from a logistic regression of roll call votes on state public opinion, while the lighter lines depict uncertainty in the estimated regressions.
The hash marks at the top and bottom of each panel depict state opinion for "yes" and "no" votes, respectively. For the more controversial nominees, there is a significant relationship between voting and opinion, although there is variation across nominees. The curve is most steep and precisely estimated for the Roberts vote, while the curves for Rehnquist and Thomas are less steep and less precisely estimated. For the lopsided roll call votes, there is too little variation for any predictor to explain voting well. The bottom panel shows the estimated logit curve from pooling all nominees. The correlation is strong: as a senator's constituents become more supportive of a nominee, he is more likely to vote affirmatively.
Can we conclude that public opinion influences roll call voting, rather than simply aligning with it? To answer this question, we turn to a multivariate analysis of roll call voting on Supreme Court nominees, so that we can control for other influences.
Data and methods. We build on existing studies, which model voting on Supreme Court nominees primarily as a function of nominee quality, the ideological distance between a senator and a nominee, partisanship, and presidential strength. These studies show that senators are likely to support high quality nominees regardless of ideological distance, but that the probability of approval for is lower for low quality nominees, especially for nominees who are ideologically distant. With this in mind, we use the following predictors:
Lack of Quality: the degree to which a nominee is judged (according to newspaper editorials (Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990) to be unqualified to join the Court. It ranges from 0 (most qualified) to 1 (least). Less qualified nominees are less likely to be approved.
9 Roll call and other data for all nominees except Alito come from (Epstein et al. 2006 ).
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Ideological Distance: The ideological distance between the senator and the nominee, as measured using an institutional bridging technique that combines Common Space scores (Poole 1998 ) and Segal-Cover scores (Segal and Cover 1989) . (Nominees chosen by presidents of the same party as the Senate majority serve as a bridge to link senators' and nominees ideal point estimates.) Ideologically distant senators are less likely to support nominees.
Same Party: Coded 1 if the senator is a co-partisan of the president, who are more likely to support a nominee than opposite party senators.
Presidential Capital : We use two measures to capture presidential capital. The first, "strong president," is coded 1 if the president was not in his 4th year of office and his party controlled the Senate at the time. 10 We also use the more direct measure of public approval of the president, based on the most recent Gallup poll taken before a nominee's confirmation vote. Nominees appointed by presidents with more capital are more likely to gain senators' approval.
Figure 3 presents descriptive statistics for each predictor. All continuous predictors in the models have been standardized by centering (at zero) and dividing by two standard deviations-as a result, the coefficients for all continuous and binary predictors are comparable on roughly the same scale (Gelman 2008) . A one unit change in the continuous predictors covers two standard deviations of that predictor. Because these transformation are linear, they do not affect any inferences about statistical significance; rather, they simply make it easier to interpret the relative substantive magnitude of each predictor and to make comparisons and about relative magnitudes across predictors.
Our expectation is that constituent opinion will play a strong role in driving the votes of senators. However, we still expect that the others variables noted above will continue to have an independent contribution to explanatory power, as shown by Epstein et al. (2006) We begin by adding public opinion to this basic model, yielding Model 2. The coefficient on Opinion is statistically significant, and its magnitude is comparable to that of Ideological Distance. In addition, the significance of the other predictors remains similar to Model 1.
Results
These results indicate that as state opinion of a nominee increases, senators are more likely to support her, even after controlling for well-known predictors of the vote.
Model 3 presents the results of a multilevel model, which recognizes that the votes are grouped by nominee. It includes varying intercepts for each nominee (i.e., random effects),
11 It is also possible that quality and ideology have indirect effects that operate through public opinion. However, these are weakly correlated with opinion (.33 and .37 respectively). effect. We also show the varying intercepts for Model 4 in Table 2 (and discuss them below).
Finally, Model 5 assesses the degree to which the relationship between opinion and voting may be conditioned by a senator's proximity to his re-election bid. Examining the Thomas nomination, Overby et al. (1992) found that only senators up for reelection in 1992 (the next election after the vote) were influenced by the percentage of blacks in their home states. However, examining the Thurgood Marshall nomination, Overby et al. (1994) found no such interactive effect between proximity to election and black population. We take a more general approach, interacting state opinion with an indicator variable, Reelection, coded 1 if a vote on a nominee took place within two years of the senators' next reelection. The coefficient on Opinion in Model 4 gives the estimated effect of public opinion on senators who were not facing reelection: it is unchanged from Models 1 and 3. The coefficient on the interaction term is small and not statistically different from zero, indicating that there is no additional effect of opinion on senators facing reelection. Thus, as a general matter, we can conclude that the effect of opinion is more related to senators' long-term interests in maintaining constituent support, rather a more short-term focus on whether a vote contrary to such support will have immediate negative consequences.
In terms of model performance, Table 2 shows that while all the models do quite well at explaining votes, model fit improves significantly when public opinion included. Akaike's information criterion (AIC) shows that the "best" model is Model 4, which includes opinion and allows the intercepts to vary by nominee. 12 Adding Opinion reduces the error by an additional 5%, and allowing intercepts to vary by another 5%. The percentage correctly classified remains high even if Opinion is omitted, but a simple model of just Opinion and Same Party will itself correctly classify 89% of the observations, and adding varying intercepts brings this to 91% (models available upon request). In summary, adding opinion increases the fit of the model significantly and has a strong independent effect on vote.
The rescaled coefficients show that the effects of Opinion are larger than switching the party affiliation of the senator, larger than shifting the strength of the president making the appointment from weak to strong, larger than changing the quality of the nominee, and even larger than a shift in nominee effect from the nominee with the highest random effect (Rehnquist) to the nominee with the lowest (Alito). Only the senator's ideological distance to the nominee has a potentially greater impact (across a standardized range of that predictor) on the vote. A (two standard deviation) shift in distance has a greater effect than that of public opinion, but no other predictor comes close.
We explain the substantive implications of the statistical results in detail below, when we give a wide range of predicted probabilities under different conditions and show how the impact of public opinion varies with context. For now, we note that, given the results in model 4, the upper bound of the effect of Opinion on vote probability is that a one point increase in the former leads to a four point increase in the latter. A two-standard-deviation swing in Opinion could have an effect as large as 95%. Of course, effects this large would only apply to a senator who is already wavering in his vote. 13 Dividing a logit coefficient by four yields the rough upper bound of its effect, which will be at the steepest part of the logit curve, near 50% (Gelman and Hill 2006, 119) . Re-estimating
Model 4 with Opinion on its original scale leads to an estimated coefficient of .15 (.03).
Note that the random effects (or justice effects) in the last column of Table 2 and 4, which capture any idiosyncracies by nominee not otherwise controlled for, do vary quite a bit. 14 A nominee effect of zero indicates the nominee did as well on average as one would expect from the substantive predictors. All else equal, controlling for all the predictors of vote included in the models, Rehnquist was more likely to get a yes vote than one would otherwise predict;
O'Connor and Bork come close to average in this respect, and Alito was the mirror image of Rehnquist, equally less likely to get a yes vote. The standard deviation of these varying intercepts is 1.1, which would correlate to an upper bound of about 25 percentage points change in the probability of a senator voting yes.
Discussion
To flesh out our findings, we calculate and graph predicted probabilities of a senator voting yes on the nominee for an assortment of configurations. Given that marginal probabilities in a logit model vary across predictor values, such displays will help us understand how the impact of public opinion varies given the values of the other predictors in the model, as well as how the impact of these other predictors varies given different levels of public opinion. We use model 4 for all predicted values in the text. All predictions use the following baseline setup unless otherwise noted: continuous predictors are set to their mean, party is set to the opposition party, and the random effect is that for an average nominee (zero, by construction). For continuous predictors, we set "low" values to be those one standard deviation below the predictor mean, and "high" values to be those one standard deviation above the mean. For discussion of specific values, we calculate probabilities using simulated 14 We tried including average opinion across states by nominee (a nominee level variable), but this was not significant, led to a worse AIC, and did not meaningfully change the random effects, suggesting that these effects were not simply picking up differences in average opinion.
draws of coefficients given their values and standard errors, thus capturing the underlying uncertainty of the coefficient estimates. We then calculate the mean probability or mean change in probability over 1,000 random draws of coefficients as applied to the scenario under discussion. Where helpful, we include parenthetical 95% confidence intervals.
We show the effects of varying state-level public pinion on the nominee, given different levels of the other predictors, in Figure 4 . The graphs use point predictions from the logistic regressions, which closely resemble those calculated using simulations, but yield smoother plots. Each panel highlights a shift in a different predictor or set of predictors. Public opinion is on the x-axis in each panel, ranging from 35% to 95% support (the approximate range of the opinion data used). The non-shaded regions depict the range of public opinion between low opinion (one standard deviation below the mean) and high opinion (one standard deviation above)-that is, the range where most observations fall. The predicted probability of voting yes is shown on the y-axis in each panel. Across curves, at a given level of opinion, we can compare the effect of changing the predictor noted in the panel description.
The solid line in the first panel (actually, in all panels in the top and bottom rows),
show the predicted effects under baseline conditions. In the baseline setup, near average opinion, a one-point increase in constituent support implies a 2.2 [.7, 4.1] point increase in the probability of a yes vote. An opinion level of almost 60% is needed to get the probability of a yes vote to 50%. A two-standard deviation swing centered at mean opinion implies an increase in vote probability from roughly 40% to 97%.
In this first panel, we also show the differential effects of low and high quality. At the baseline, shifting from low to high quality (technically, shifting from high lack of quality to low lack of quality) will increase the probability of a yes from 70% to 90%. For highopinion nominees, quality has almost no effect, but for low opinion nominees, the difference in probability of a yes vote is roughly 28 points. Quality levels also affect the impact of opinion. A unit shift in opinion (as always, near average opinion) has an impact of 3.0 [1.1, 4.6] points when quality is low, but only half that when quality is high, 1.4 [.2, 3.7] (this particular difference is not significant). For a two-standard deviation shift in opinion, the impact is about 65 points when quality is low, and only about 40 points when quality is high.
Thus we see that a high quality nominee is still vulnerable to public opinion, but somewhat less so than a low quality opinion. To put this another way, roughly 50% public support in a state gets a high quality nominee to a 50-50 chance of a yes vote from that state's senator.
A low quality nominee needs roughly 65% support to have the same chance. To put this another way, high-opinion nominees see little difference between same-and opposite-party senators (holding distance constant), but low-opinion nominees are very vulnerable (given the distance between the curves). We can also see that party has a meaningful effect by comparing the opinion level necessary for the president's fellow partisans to give him a 50-50 chance at a yes vote, roughly 45%, to that level of support necessary in an opposing senator's home state, over 60%.
The third panel displays the impact of ideological distance among opposite party members, and shows that distance between the nominee and the senator is of greater consequence than quality. For the former, a distant nominee needs 70% support to have the same 50-50 chance as an ideologically closer nominee with 45% support-while it takes roughly an additional 15 points of support to make up for low vs. high quality, it takes 25 points to make up for large vs. small ideological distance. Also, while low-opinion nominees are very vulnerable to ideological distance, the difference between the curves even at the right standard deviation line shows that even high-opinion nominees have to worry somewhat about ideology-over the typical range in distance it means the difference between roughly a 79% chance of a yes vote and a near guarantee of support. Interestingly, the probability of a yes vote is roughly the same for an opposite party senator of average distance from a nominee and a same party senator who is far removed from a nominee.
The effects of opinion over its typical range differ between near nominees and far nom- The fifth panel shows that there is some difference in the treatment of nominations by presidents with high versus low public approval once we control for opinion on nominees, but not to the extent of partisanship or the other predictors. That said, for low opinion nominees, 15 Because of covariation one cannot simply compare the overlap in confidence intervals to assess statistical significance. Rather, we specifically test the difference in differences.
being nominated by a president with high approval ratings would mean the difference between a predicted 40% chance of a yes vote and a predicted 60% chance.
The final panel explores those differences in nominee outside those captured by the substantive predictors, 16 as captured by the variance in intercept by nominee (if we were already capturing full variance across nominees, these random effects would be zero). A "good" nominee is one with a positive intercept shift, one standard deviation above zero; a "bad" nominee is one with a negative intercept shift, one standard deviation below zero. Both types would need to worry about opinion, but the slope is much steeper (in the central region) for a bad nominee. A high-opinion nominee might see little variation in vote given this (a bad nominee would still have nearly a 90% chance of a yes vote), but the difference for low-opinion nominees is much larger (18% vs. 67%). A good nominee might need around 55% public support in the state to get an even chance at a yes vote; a bad one would need around 70%.
Counterfactuals. One additional way to assess the importance of public opinion in confirmation politics is to make counterfactual "predictions" had the public felt differently about the nominees. We ask three questions based on such counterfactuals.
Should Bork blame the public? As can be seen in Figure 1 Did the public confirm Justice Thomas? Justice Thomas also faced a tough confirmation fight, eventually being confirmed with 52 votes (the same as we would have predicted)
after Anita Hill's allegations nearly derailed him. Thomas was more popular a nominee on average than was Bork, and a bit more popular than Alito. Did this make a difference in his confirmation vote? What if he had been as unpopular as Bork? Our prediction, applying
Bork's state-by-state opinion level instead of his own, is that Thomas would have received only 36 votes-a landslide vote against confirmation. Of course, with expected support from the public and therefore from the Senate so low, it seems likely that his nomination would have been withdrawn rather than fail by so wide a margin. vocal opposition from members of his own party. By the time of the withdrawal, the public had already been polled on whether she should be confirmed. Using this data, we created estimates of state public opinion as we did for the nominees who went to a vote. We found that average state-level opinion was 50% in favor, among those with an opinion, ranging from a low of 42% support in Hawaii to 58% support in Nebraska. On average, she is tied with Bork, with less variation across states. Her Lack of quality score is .64, higher than any of our other nominees. Neither her quality nor opinion levels would be good omens for a successful confirmation, as compared to, say, Alito. On the other hand, because she was more ideologically moderate than Alito, her average ideological distance from senators (.14)
was slightly less than the average across our nominees (.18) and clearly less than the average for Alito (.21) (it places her on part with Souter or Ruth Ginsburg for average ideological compatibility with the senators). This factor would push in her favor in comparison to Alito (who, again, wound up with 58 votes).
We start by temporarily setting aside any idiosyncratic features of her nomination and assume she was otherwise an average nominee (nominee effect set to zero). Under this assumption, our best prediction is that she would have won 56 votes. This suggests in part that the problem with the Miers nomination was not the usual one-the inability to grab sufficient votes from the opposition party-but the unusually loud criticism among
Republicans and conservative activists. If we take into account Miers's other weaknesses and poor performances in her dealings with the senators (e.g., Greenburg 2007, 278-281) , by attributing to her the same negative nominee effect as Alito, then our best prediction would be that she would only have received 42 votes.
What part of this is due to public opinion? To assess the effect of public opinion on confirmation voting, we next predicted senator votes assuming the public had supported
Miers to the same extent they did Alito (maintaining the negative nominee effect). We would then predict she would sail through confirmation with 60 votes.
We plot these three scenarios in Figure 5 , with the probability of a positive vote on the vertical axes, and either opinion in the senator's state on the x-axis (left panels), or the senator's ideology score (right panels). Within the left panels, Democrats clump at the bottom and Republicans clump at the top. Within the right panels, Democrats clump at the left and Republicans clump at the right. In the first scenario, top row, assuming that Miers was otherwise an average nominee, it largely comes down to a party vote. But, the second row of panels shows that Miers idiosyncratic flaws would have killed almost any chance of getting the votes of Democratic senators and would have put the votes of at least a dozen Republicans into doubt. The third row of panels show how public support could have
saved Miers yet, providing her with not only with a firm foundation among Republicans, but pulling at least a handful of Democrats in her favor as well.
These hypotheticals illustrate the pivotal role of public opinion in confirmation politics.
Shifts in public support can mean the difference between Justice Bork and Justice Kennedy.
Conclusion
The public's influence over justices after confirmation may be in doubt, but influence over confirmation is not. Even the six-year terms of senators do not make them invulnerable to public pressure. This ties the Court back to majority will. Our findings are particularly timely given the close split on the Court today between liberal and conservative justices and the strong possibility that the next president will have the opportunity to name at least one justice to the the Court. Constituent opinion is a strong and robust predictor of a senator's roll call vote even after controlling for the strongest known influences on confirmation votes.
This finding establishes a strong and systematic link between constituent opinion and voting on Supreme Court nominees. Even high quality nominees and those proffered by strong presidents are vulnerable to constituent influence. On the other hand, constituent opinion plays a larger role in the vote calculus of those positioned to oppose the nominee, whether for partisan or ideological reasons, than for those who will otherwise be likely to support the nomine, and for weaker nominees more generally.
Senators do respond to other forces besides opinion, most notably their own preferences and partisanship. Our results thus speak to larger debates about the tradeoffs between these forces. First, we find clear evidence of party effects, consistent with partisan theories of legislative organization and behavior (Aldrich 1995, Cox and McCubbins 2005) . This suggests that senators balance party pressure with direct constituent pressure, or that the long-term electoral calculus pushes towards maintenance of the party label through confirmation or rejection of the president's nominee (for co-partisans or the opposition respectively).
Second, that personal preferences still matter suggests that senators are willing to partially "shirk" the desires of their constituents, in pursuit of their own ideological goals. Our results speak to the empirical literature on responsiveness, dating back to Miller and Stokes (1963) and to more recent work (e.g., Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, Bafumi and Herron 2007) .
Overall, the trend of the literature, to paint broadly, is that democracy works and policy choices are responsive though imperfectly so. Whether shirking happens in any particular voting context is an empirical question. One advantage of our approach is that we were able to assess representation in a concrete set of votes, in contrast to the aggregate responsiveness which is the more common focus in the existing literature. We run a separate model for each nominee. We use a multilevel logistic regression model, estimated using the LMER function ("linear mixed effects in R," Bates (2005) ). For data with hierarchical structure (e.g., individuals within states within regions), multilevel modeling is generally an improvement over classical regression. Rather than using "fixed"
(or "unmodeled") effects, the model uses "random" (or "modeled") effects, at least for some predictors. The effects within a grouping of variables (say, state level effects) are related to each other by their grouping structure and thus are partially pooled towards the group mean, with greater pooling when group-level variance is small and for less-populated groups.
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The degree of pooling within the grouping emerges from the data endogenously. This is equivalent to assuming errors are correlated within a grouping structure. (See Gelman and Hill (2007, 244-8,254-8,262-5) .)
Our goal is to estimate the percentage of those supporting the nominee of those with an opinion. We start by modeling explicit support for confirmation (coded as y i = 1), as compared to explicit disapproval of confirmation or answering "do not know" (coded as y i = 0). We subsequently model explicit disapproval of confirmation against those approving or staying silent. Then, once we have the estimated percentage within each state that explicitly approves and the estimated percentage that explicitly disapproves, we can divide the former by the sum of both estimates to yield the share of those who explicitly approve out of those with an opinion.
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While the predictors we use in each response model vary slightly across nominees, based on the demographic information was available in the survey data, each model takes the following basic form, with individual i, and indexes j, k, l, m, s, and p for race-gender combination, age category, education category, region, state, and poll respectively:
We cannot simply drop the "do not know" respondents as the likelihood of so responding will vary across respondent types, weights for which represent all respondents, not simply those with an opinion. Modeling "yes of those with an opinion" by applying MRP twice, first for explicit "yes" and then for explicit "no," we avoid using the non-random sample of respondents we would have left after dropping anyone who answered "do not know." 18 We drop predictors when there is insufficient variation to distinguish effects from zero to the limits of the LMER algorithm, that is, when there is no residual variation for these terms to pick up: for O'Connor, state, religion, and presidential vote; for Ginsburg, religion;
and for Breyer, religion. Given variation across polls on Bork, we also let age level effects vary by poll. The results of Lax and Phillips (2009) show that such minor variations are irrelevant. The goal is the best predictive model possible. To compare effects of predictors across nominees, not the goal here, we would use the same predictors in each model.
The terms after the intercept are modeled effects for the various groups of respondents:
That is, each is modeled as drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and endogenous variance. The state effects are in turn modeled as a function of the region into which the state falls, the state's conservative religious percentage, and the contemporaneous Democratic presidential candidate's state-level vote share (group-level predictors reduce unexplained group-level variation, leading to more precise estimation). The region variable is, in turn, another modeled effect:
We use these to calculate predicted probabilities of nominee support for each demographicgeographic type. Since we controlled for poll effects, we must choose a specific poll coefficient when generating predicted values using the inverse logit. We use the average across the polls included in each policy question's sample, thus averaging out any time effects as well.
There are 4,896 possible combinations of demographic and state values (96 within each state), ranging from "White," "Male," "Age 18-29," "Not high school graduate," in "Alabama," to "Hispanic," "Female," "Age 65+," "College degree or more," in "Wyoming."
For any cell j, specifying a set of individual demographic and geographic values, the results above allow us to make a prediction of pro-gay support, θ j . Specifically, θ j is the inverse logit given the relevant predictors and their estimated coefficients based on equation (1).
We next poststratify according to population percentages. That is, the prediction in each cell needs to be weighted by the actual population frequency of that cell, N j . For each state, we then can calculate the percentage who support the policy, aggregating over each cell j in state s: y
We calculate the necessary population frequencies using the "1-Percent Public Use Mi- Figure 4 : The predicted effects of opinion on roll call voting. Each panel shows the predicted probability of a senator voting yes on confirmation, across the range of state-level public opinion, for different levels of the other predictors. All predictions derived from Model 3 in Table 2 . The default value of each continuous variable is its mean. "Low" values are one standard deviation below this; "high" values are one standard deviation above. We assume unless otherwise noted that the senator is of the opposite party, that the president is weak, and that the nominee is otherwise average (random effect set to zero). The non-shaded regions depict the range of public opinion between low opinion (one standard deviation below the mean) and high opinion (one standard deviation above)-that is, the range where most observations fall. 38
Were Miers otherwise an average nomimee ... Table 2 : Explaining roll call voting. The first two models are regular logistic regressions. The third, fourth and fifth are multilevel models with varying intercepts for each nominee. We present only the estimates of these intercepts for Model 4. For all models, * indicates p < .05. All continuous predictors in the models have been standardized by centering and dividing by two standard deviations-as a result, the coefficients for the continuous and binary predictors are comparable on roughly the same scale.
